

Trusted Knoppix

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
Overview

- Introduction
- Trusted Computing
- Protocol for Exchange of a Secret
- Conclusion


Introduction




Introduction



Trusted Platform Module



Key Hierarchy




TPM Features

- Integrity measurements
 - Identify software by hash values
- Secure attestation
 - Fraud resistant attestation of the measurements
- Sealing and Binding
 - Allows to seal data to a defined state

Authenticated Boot

- Transitive Trust: Measure before execution



Actions

- Hash files
- Extend Register (PCR)
 $PCR_{t+1} = \text{SHA1}(PCR_t | \text{hash})$
- Quote Registers
- Bind / Seal data to PCRs

Existing Projects for Linux

Application

Operating System

Kernel / Initrd

Bootloader

BIOS
(Trusted Building Block)

IMA: Integrity Measurement Architecture
Trousers: Trusted Software Stack


TPMdd: Device Drivers for TPMs

trustedGrub: TCG complying Bootloader


Initial Protocol



Protocol using SSL/TLS



Protocol without SSL



Conclusion

- Two Protocols developed
- Implementation uses SSL/TLS
- Migration to Knoppix
- Privacy concerns
 - Currently, the server can identify each TPM
 - Introduction of an additional layer
 - Privacy Certification Authority as Trusted Third Party
 - Direct Anonymous Attestation